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Abstract. Th is paper explains how we create concepts such as the forest or the 
backyard through language. Refl ecting on Andreas Weber’s hope for a revolution 
of the life sciences and a re-evaluation of the role human beings play in nature, this 
paper adopts as a starting point Bruno Latour’s characterization of the distinction 
between nature and culture as an illusion that came with Modernity. Th eoretical 
notions from modelling systems theory and cognitive linguistics explain that while 
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habits and changes of belief depend on face-to-face and non-verbal communication 
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Introduction
While walking a group of children across my university campus on a hot summer day, 
they noticed some large ‘banana spiders’ (golden silk orbweaver, Nephila clavipes) 
that are common in South Florida. When one of the children noticed a particularly 
large spider web, the whole group lunged sideways away from it with disgust. When 
I walked with the children again a few days later, they swerved away from the trees 
anticipating the spiders, some of them darting ahead so as to avoid even catching 
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another glimpse of these ‘critt ers’. Th is perception of the presence of spiders as a 
pest, an invasion or infestation, is symptomatic of the reaction of most adults and 
children I know. Th e concept of pest control invokes a widespread narrative of how 
most spiders and insects are perceived in the West. I could have used the ants at the 
Pre-School playground half a mile away, that are routinely exterminated by a squad 
from Building Services so that no 3-year-old ever has to encounter an ant crawling 
on the play equipment.
Th e despair over this widespread att itude of alienation from, disinterest or 
even disgust towards many animals around us inspired the biologist/philosopher 
Andreas Weber to articulate his own att itude towards nature in his book Alles fühlt: 
Mensch, Natur, und die Revolution der Lebenswissenschaft en (2008). I imagined Weber 
encountering spiders in the woods around Berlin; or Jakob von Uexküll walking the 
meadows near Heidelberg or Hamburg or the Estonian island of Puhtu with his 
children, and how diff erent their reaction to a spider web would have been. Or it 
could have been Goethe strolling through the woods near Weimar or the gardens 
in Rome, or Alexander von Humboldt on one of his voyages to the New World. In 
fact, I am certain Humboldt met an Orbweaver and took a good look at what these 
spiders can do, admiring the precision of the web’s architecture, its remarkable size, 
and the mechanical strength of its silk that shines like gold in the sunshine. Is my 
writing this a small link in a long chain of cognitive habits that originated in German 
Romanticism?
When I read a version of this paper at a conference, Lynn Margulis approached 
me during a coff ee break and reminded me that what I am talking about here is, 
of course, biophilia (Wilson 1984). According to Margulis – and E. O. Wilson – 
you either have it or you don’t. You’re either drawn to nature or you’re not. Th is 
paper describes an alternative to the idea that there are people with biophilia who 
adore nature, and others who don’t care about it. Instead, this paper explains that 
our att itudes towards nature and the role we play in it are shaped by the languages 
we speak, and the concepts that refer to the natural world, and the narratives evoked 
by the specifi c concepts we use.
As a starting point, this paper addresses Bruno Latour’s proposal that, fi rst, the 
distinction between nature and culture is a Modern illusion that determines how we 
see ourselves and other species; and, second, that our att itudes towards nature are 
constructed to a large degree through language.
Back to Weber, Uexküll and his children, Goethe, and Humboldt. Are those 
just refl exes of German Ronanticism? Do the German tradition of Naturphilosophie 
going back to Kant, Goethe, Fichte and Schelling, to name a few; and all the cultural 
practices of Romantic biology in the 18th and 19th centuries; and all their good and 
bad complex cultural forms of the 20th century (cf. Harrington 1996) to the enduring 
21st century practices that were characterized recently by an American textbook for 
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German language and culture as “the German obsession with recycling”1) all att est 
to this cultural belief system? Maybe that explains why only a German biologist and 
philosopher like Andreas Weber (2008) could so fervently anticipate and describe 
a new biology that entails a new perspective on the role human beings play in nature 
that could take us back to a way of looking at all other organisms as subjects just like 
ourselves. A Romantic biology as it is anchored in the work of Goethe depends on the 
human perception of nature; in fact, according to this Romantic view any beauty in 
nature lies in the ability to perceive it. In other words, much like Uexküll’s umwelt 
is the subjective world that is created by each organism, the human perception of 
nature itself creates its perfect form and sees beauty in nature through a Romantic 
biology.
Weber’s self-eff acing personal narrative is easily att ached to this cultural belief 
system; and his choice of an Ernst Haeckel plate as a cover illustration of his book 
published in 2008 is a nod to 19th-century Romantic biology. What may be half self-
irony and half reverence to this long chain of cognitive habits and cultural practices 
in the German-speaking world also att ests to the Peircean dictum that the fi xation 
of belief requires a community of believers. Th at Weber is not alone in his att itude 
towards nature in the German-speaking context is beyond doubt, but the reception 
of his work in translation can only further emphasize its anachronistic affi  nities with 
German Romanticism. As Lotman (2001[1990]: 123–124) explained: “while some 
parts of the semiosphere are still enjoying the poetics of Romanticism, others may 
have moved far on into post-Romanticism”.
But can the average 21st-century global citizen of this planet ever look at spiders 
again the way Alexander von Humboldt, Goethe, or Uexküll would have looked at 
them? Can we accept again that it is our perception that creates beauty in nature? 
And can we teach our children how to perceive/create nature?
The revolution of the life sciences
Weber (2008: 20)2 is deeply concerned that “[we] are extinguishing life, because we 
have the wrong idea about its character. We can be cruel, because we are mistaking it 
for ‘stuff ’ [Gerümpel]”. He uses two strategies to convince the reader that a new way 
of seeing nature, and a new concept of nature, is possible: Th e fi rst strategy consists 
of personal narrative of his own relationship with and interest in other species. In 
1 See Abrams, Zsuzsanna 2008. Deutsch im Blick. University of Texas, Austin htt p://www.
coerll.utexas.edu/dib/credits.php).
2 Translations from Weber and Jakob von Uexküll are mine – P. A. 
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other words, he constructs and shares his own view of nature through his narrative, 
inviting the reader, for instance, to consider communing with toads:
Have you ever looked into the eyes of a toad? Th ey are large and round like deep 
ponds; but the iris in which the pupil opens has the colour of gold. Don’t be 
afraid. You can get very close. And you’ll see dark gems project into space. Th e 
inside has thousands of small shiny folds, microscopic mountains and canyons 
and fl ickering stars. Th e toad’s eye responds with the refl ection of a night sky. 
Th at’s fi ction, you say? A toad is just an animal and our appreciation of this 
species a matt er of taste? Maybe you fi nd it ugly? Wait a minute. Take another 
good look. Fix your eyes on it like I have done; and you’ll see that someone is 
looking back at you. Not a thing, but something that is alive. (Weber 2008: 23)
Figure 1. Toad eye ( Matt  Reinbold).
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Weber’s description eff ectively reshapes the reader’s perception of toads through 
poetic devices that construct a concept that invokes beauty and perfection where 
most existing narratives may have entailed ugliness. Weber’s second strategy is to 
expose the reader to recent research in fi elds like neuroscience, ethology, and the 
philosophy of nature that exemplifi es new directions in repositioning humanness in 
nature or questioning the conventional divide between human and non-human. An 
example of the type of recent research Weber off ers is an overview of the aff ective 
neuroscience experiments by the neurobiologist Jaak Panksepp (2004). In these 
experiments, Panksepp measured the brain activity of young rats while stroking 
them on their bellies to show that the electrical currents are similar to those of 
humans when they are tickled (Weber 2008: 106). Th ese are scientifi c facts. But 
as cognitive linguists tell us, frames always trump facts (cf. Lakoff  2004). And so 
Weber shift s back and forth between science writing and personal narrative to show 
the reader how much we have in common with other species; and how much we 
have constructed a reality that divides us from them. He makes it clear from the 
beginning that his motivation to write the book stems from a profound sense of 
despair over the fact that “biologists cannot say what life really is” (Weber 2008: 21).
Uexküll’s notion of umwelt ranks high in Weber’s armamentarium of theoretical 
concepts that could promote this revolution of the life sciences among biologists. 
Simple as it may sound to anyone who is intellectually immersed in semiotics, the 
notion that we create our own subjective reality is fundamental to an understanding 
of our relationship with nature. As Jakob von Uexküll explained “[no] matt er how 
certain we are of the reality that surrounds us, it only exists in our capacities to 
perceive it. Th at is the threshold we have to cross before we can go any further” 
(Uexküll 1902: 213).
Th ure von Uexküll outlined the main aspects of Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt 
theory (Uexküll, T. v. 1982: 4–8) as follows:
(1) [True] reality ( Jakob von Uexküll calls it Natur) that lies beyond or 
behind the nature that physicists, chemists, or microbiologists conceive 
of in their scientifi c systems reveals itself through signs. Th ese signs are 
therefore the only true reality, and the rules and laws to which the signs 
and sign-processes are subject are the only real laws of nature. […]
(2) Th e methodology of umwelt-research, which aims to reconstruct this 
‘creating’ of creative nature […] means, therefore reconstructing the 
Umwelt of another living being. […]
(3) Th e aim of umwelt research is to create a theory of the composition of 
nature […] [by exploring] the sign-processes that govern the behavior 
of living subjects. 
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Uexküll unequivocally approached nature and culture entirely through the analysis 
of signs and sign processes; and his concept of Funktionskreis has established itself as 
a general model of semiosis. Th is radical constructivist position att aches a diff erent 
narrative to the concept of ecology; namely one that studies organisms as subjects 
creating their environment rather than simply interacting with it. According to 
Jesper Hoff meyer (1996: 59), “one can never hope to understand the dynamic of 
an ecosystem without some kind of umwelt theory”. For Hoff meyer, a revolution of 
the life sciences begins with a biology that is rooted in semiotics. Th is new biology
[…] does not turn experimental biology to metaphysics but instead replaces an 
outdated metaphysics – the thought that life is only chemistry and molecules – 
with a far bett er, more contemporary, and more coherent philosophy. Life 
rather than natural law – and signs rather than atoms – must become natural 
science’s fundamental phenomena. (Hoff meyer 2008: 15)
Hybrids and the Modern Constitution
In his essay We Have Never Been Modern (1993[1991]), Bruno Latour lays out 
the Modern Constitution that separates “three regions of being” (Latour 1993: 
39) – nature, politics, and discourse (Latour 1993: 3) – through the processes he 
calls purifi cation and translation or mediation (Latour 1993: 10). While the work 
of purifi cation separates nature from society and keeps the natural sciences as the 
domain of explaining natural phenomena separate from the social sciences as the 
domain of explaining the social order; the work of mediation how “mixing biology 
and society” makes it possible that “[all] of culture and all of nature get churned 
up again every day” (Latour 1993: 2). Th e work of purifi cation is characterized by 
working within the strict disciplinary boundaries of the natural sciences, so that the 
facts of nature are, in fact, created in the laboratory. Practices of purifi cation rely on 
“two diff erent ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand, and that 
of non-humans on the other” (Latour 1993: 10). Non-humans make much bett er 
informants in the lab. Th e work of mediation is the work of hybrids. Th e paradox of 
the Modern Constitution is that the separation of nature and society (= purifi cation) 
both makes mediation possible, but marginalizes it and renders it invisible at the 
same time. Only hybrids, says Latour (1993: 11), “can change the future”.
Andreas Weber’s perspective then appears as a non-Modern analysis of what our 
relationship with the non-human could look like in the West and his work has the 
characteristics of a true hybrid. Latour (1993: 14) explains that while anthropologists 
who study non-Western cultures move eff ortlessly between the ontological zones 
and “tackl[e] everything at once” (Latour 1993: 14), nature – social order – critical 
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discourse, the Modern Constitution makes it impossible for the West. Latour basi-
cally wanted to show that natural phenomena and natural science should be connected 
to politics and the social order the way anthropologists do it auto matically when they 
study non-Western cultures, or pre-Modern “natures/cultures” as Latour calls them. 
“If we consider hybrids, we are dealing only with mixtures of nature and culture; if 
we consider the work of purifi cation, we confront a total separation between nature 
and culture” (Latour 1993: 30). Th ere are no “cultures” for Latour. Th ere are only 
natures/cultures. Hence, he says, we have never been modern.
“Th e essential point of this Constitution is that it renders the work of mediation 
that assembles hybrids invisible, unthinkable, unrepresentable” (Latour 1993: 
34). Th e work of hybrids, according to Latour (1993: 35), always has the odour of 
ideology: “Sorting out the kernels of science from the chaff  of ideology became the 
task for generations of well-meaning modernizers”. For those who live by the Modern 
Constitution, Andreas Weber is a “hopeless romantic”; seen as a hybrid, Weber’s 
work is eff ective and powerful mediation that has the potential to change things in the 
future. But can his description of a toad’s eye change our perception of toads?
Maybe Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio’s notion of semioethics can also be 
understood as an imperative to practice the work of mediation by always connecting 
science with the social order and the critical discourse, because that is precisely the 
orientation in the study of signs that involves “the exquisitely human capacity for 
critique” (cf. Petrilli, Ponzio 2010: 162) and it situates (bio-)semiotics as precisely 
the “vast life science” that Sebeok envisioned in his Global Semiotics (2001). Th e 
notion of a network that crosses the ontological zones and institutionalized disciplines 
characterizes both Latour’s work of mediation and Sebeok’s Global Semiotics.
Can’t see the forest for the trees
In 1999, the tropical ecologist John Terborgh had announced that “nature [had] 
been extinguished” in El Salvador (Terborgh 1999). A Malthusian nightmare had 
supposedly come true in the most crowded country in Latin America and there were 
no more forests left . But when UCLA political ecologist Susanna Hecht (cf. 2006) 
came to El Salvador in 1999, she found plenty of forests; as long as she counted 
so-called “anthropogenic forests” there didn’t seem to be much of a problem at all. 
Th ere were plenty of trees in El Salvador. Just the ‘old’ forests were gone, the ones 
that were believed to be pristine forests like the Amazon. Less than ten years later, 
at a conference on Th e Social Life of Forests held at the University of Chicago in 
May 2008, political ecologists came to the conclusion, that pristine forests were an 
“invention of the Western mind” rather than something found in the real world. Th e 
real world here, of course, refers to the perceived, so-called, ‘objective reality’ of old 
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forests that were there before any humans appeared in them. Of course, historically, 
there were at some point forests untouched by humans. Th e idea of the 21st century 
pristine forest, however, is a diff erent concept. It turns out that what the forest 
researchers had believed to be pristine forests were not untouched by man at all. 
Th is was apparently one of the most important insights that came through at the 
2008 conference. Th e other aspect that was acknowledged by economic geographers 
and cultural ecologists was that the linguistic concepts that refer to the things in the 
world we call a ‘forest’ diff er from culture to culture; in other words, the diff erent 
concepts of the forest in diff erent languages and cultures are vastly dissimilar and 
evoke very diff erent narratives. At the conference in Chicago, Susanna Hecht quoted 
an indigenous defi nition of the forest as, “[one] big thing. It has plants and it has 
animals – and it has people” (Mertens 2008).3 Apparently, this was when everyone 
realized that with the pristine forest the West had created a diff erent narrative of 
places like the Amazon, namely an “idea of pure and untrammeled nature [that] has 
[…] served a more spiritual purpose, preserving the image of an unfallen world, 
untainted by war, industrialism, and other affl  ictions of civilization” (Mertens 2008).
While this idea of the pristine forest fi ts the Modern Constitution, it also created 
important associated narratives in the West such as deforestation and a host of ideas 
on how to go about nature conservation. If the pristine forest is perceived as “pure 
and untrammeled”, it is no coincidence that for a long time, conservation eff orts 
simply meant removing people from the nature that had to be conserved. It is only 
when this semiotic modelling through language in the West became apparent to 
hybrids, such as Susanna Hecht and other political ecologists, that the paradigm 
of traditional conservation policies (where conserving nature meant excluding or 
removing humans) could be changed. While nature conservation used to always 
mean keeping humans out, political ecologists and cultural or economic geographers 
are now advocating a move away from the traditional “fortress conservation” 
philosophies of the West, because they understand that they created them based on 
their own culture-specifi c concepts and narratives.4
3 See Mertens, Richard 2008. Can’t see the forest for the trees. University of Chicago Magazine, 
September–October, available at htt p://magazine.uchicago.edu/0810/features/the_forest.shtml.
4 For example, political ecologist Roderick Neuman quotes Arusha National Park (opened in 
1960) and Selous Game Preserve (opened in 1905) in Tanzania as the second-largest protected 
area in Africa, home to elephants, lions, and black rhinoceroses, by expelling 40,000 people. In the 
meantime, the European Union reversed the African “fortress conservation” philosophy. Instead of 
forcing people out of protected areas, EU policies now work to keep rural people in place by paying 
farmers, herders, and others, because human activity is now understood to increase biodiversity 
rather than to diminish it, and scientists have begun to discuss the “coevolution” of nature and 
culture (Mertens, Richard 2008. Can’t see the forest for the trees. University of Chicago Magazine, 
September–October, available at htt p://magazine.uchicago.edu/0810/features/the_forest.shtml).
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While the work of these political ecologists has the mark of what Latour calls 
the “old anthropological matrix”, it shows that the concept of the forest as it exists 
in the West is now understood to be diff erent from other models of nature.
Mediating between the ontological zones, and transcending the modes of 
being, nature, social order, and discourse, is what semioticians do best. Juri Lotman 
(2001[1984]: 131f; see also Kull 1998) decades ago confi dently explained the forest 
of the West through the medieval social order and the folklore that surrounds it:
[Th e forest in the West] represents chaos, the anti-world, unstructured chthonic 
space, inhabited by monsters, infernal powers or people associated with them. 
In the countryside the sorcerer, the miller and (sometimes) the smith had to 
live outside the village, as did the executioner in a medieval town. […] People 
visit the sorcerer if he demands it by night. Th e robber lives in this anti-space: 
his home is the forest (the anti-home).
Th e forest as the anti-home is where Hänsel and Gretel got lost, where witches, 
dwarves and robbers live at least in some Western European contexts. For Lotman, 
humans create their concepts of nature predominantly through language as a 
modelling system. Language, understood as a cognitive tool with which we create 
reality and make inferences about it, connects us with a long chain of cognitive habits 
and cultural practices that include our models of nature. Even for one cultural/
linguistic tradition, an analysis of the many transformations of the concept of the 
forest would go beyond the scope of this paper. In the German tradition, it would 
continue from Lotman’s medieval anti-home to the place of Goethe’s quest for the 
Urpfl anze and nature’s perfect form to Grimm’s Märchenwald to a place of recreation 
during the period of industrialization and urbanization, the ideal natural landscape 
of the Nazis, back to the anti-home where drugs are dealt and bodies are dumped. 
Artists sometimes know this bett er than others. Th at’s why the forest is the backdrop 
of Manet’s scandalous Breakfast in the Open Air (1836), and Daniel Richter’s drug 
raid in Tuanus (2000) is a perfect representation of the contemporary narrative of the 
forest as anti-home. All this, the discourse that constructs this natural phenomenon 
we call the forest, is part of the multi-faceted narratives we have created and continue 
to create in the West. We create the forest with language and also with art.
Nature as art
A few years ago, I showed a visitor around my campus, an Italianist with an interest 
in Italian Futurism, of which we have a collection in our library. On the way to the 
library, she noticed a palm tree whose bright red seeds had dropped to the ground 
and formed a perfect circle around the stem of the palm. “Look, how beautiful...” 
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she said, “...like an art installation!” Th is illustrates perfectly what Andreas Weber 
means by seeing nature as stuff  [Gerümpel], plants as props, as parts of our man-
made infrastructure that is the opposite of seeing nature as artful. Lotman’s concept 
of the semiosphere (Lotman 2001[1990]; Kull 1998) helps clarify our dominant 
cognitive habit of seeing nature in art vs. art in nature. Seeing art in nature would 
be characteristic of the umwelt of Andreas Weber, who sees “gems” in the eyes of 
a toad in a book whose cover invokes Haeckel’s Kunstformen der Natur (Haeckel 
1904). Weber is well aware that his umwelt diff ers from that of many of his fellow 
21st century global citizens in that he sees nature as art. Th e revolution of the life 
sciences he demands is at the same time a desire to return to a golden age of Romantic 
biology or natural organicism that characterized precisely the intellectual currents 
in 19th century Germany that gave rise to Goethe’s or Humboldt’s naturalism and 
Uexküll’s umwelt theory. In Latour’s analysis, of course, Weber is also a hybrid, a 
pre-Modern thinker who sees no distinction between nature and culture, human 
and non-human, and wants us to realize that while we are nature we are constructing 
a reality that separates us from it.
Weber actually craft s a much more complex argument of nature as artful giving 
abundant examples of species that defy the Darwinian survival of the fi tt est that has 
become a cliché in the popular discourse. Th e notion of nature as artful, however, 
evokes complex narratives of many other concepts, whose analysis would lead far 
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffi  ce it to say here that a closer analysis of concepts 
like the pristine forest or the nature reserve reveal the same complicated mechanisms 
of semiotic modelling that turn the seeds of a palm tree into an art installation, or the 
so-called wilderness into a museum.
The moral economy of the American lawn
Th e backyard is another concept that can illustrate the role of language as a 
modelling system that shapes our beliefs about nature. But as Latour has shown, the 
work of mediation is much more diffi  cult in our own backyard. In a paper on “Th e 
moral economy of the American lawn”, economic geographers Paul Robbins and 
Julie Sharp (2003) examine the spread of lawn cover as a major force of ecological 
change in North America. With a conservative estimate of 23 percent of urban cover 
dedicated to lawns, they are particularly concerned that the “burgeoning application 
of fertilizers and pesticides to residential lawns has begun to off set the gains made 
in reducing the use of chemicals in agriculture” (Robbins, Sharp 2003: 425). Th ey 
argue that
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the peculiar growth and expansion of the moral economy of the lawn is the 
product of a threefold process in which (1) the lawn-chemical industry has 
implemented new and innovative styles of marketing that (2) help to produce 
an association of community, family, and environmental health with intensive 
turf-grass aesthetics and (3) refl ect an increasing local demand by consumers for 
authentic experiences of community, family, and connection to the nonhuman 
biological world through meaningful work [in the backyard]. (Robbins, Sharp 
2003: 425)
Th eir analysis adheres to the established social-science practices of quantitative ana-
lysis with a cautiously articulated hypothesis that the moral economy of the American 
lawn is infl uenced by the advertising campaigns of the lawn-chemical industry. Rob-
bins and Sharp’s analysis does not off er an examination of the role the backyard plays 
as a tool of social distinction (see, e.g., Bourdieu 1987) or an analysis of the weed-and-
feed narrative that is connected precisely to the social order that gave rise to the spread 
of lawns in the fi rst place. In short, lawns evolved from the landscape preferences of 
land-owners that made obvious how much was theirs, and made it diffi  cult for anyone 
to come near their wealth unnoticed. Even today, lawns signify land ownership and 
are believed to provide security. Robbins and Sharp’s work is a perfect example of a 
Modern analysis that separates nature from culture, the human from the non-human 
ontological zone. Th ey analyze a natural phenomenon in isolation from the social or-
der it exists in and the discourse or language that actually created it. To those who don’t 
analyze the world by the Modern Constitution, it is not diffi  cult to discern the mean-
ing of such narratives as weed-and-feed; and consider what Latour (1993) called “the 
parliament of things” – nature – social order – and discourse.
Junk nature
I am not a biologist, botanist or horticulturist, but a homeowner who constructs a 
reality of this space. I used to see myself as the responsible homeowner who uses 
the backyard for recreational purposes, for children and pets to play, protecting my 
investment by making it look nice, but doing so by pulling the weeds by hand instead 
of using chemicals. I had a sense of responsibility for this space that I executed with 
an environmentally conscious approach. Please note that the clichés in my narrative 
are intentional. In the language of cognitive linguistics, they are the metaphors I 
lived by (cf. Lakoff , Johnson 1980), they were the way I fr amed (cf. Fillmore 1976) 
the backyard in my mind. Th at was my backyard as I constructed it as part of my 
subjective reality before I met Cornelius when I was looking for more plants a few 
years ago. Cornelius owns a nursery that specializes in rare species of native plants. 
I had taken pictures of particular areas in my backyard that I felt needed more 
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landscaping. When Cornelius looked at the pictures, he told me that everything I 
actually had in my backyard at that point was ‘junk’. I was profoundly perplexed. 
I couldn’t believe he called all these plants junk. How could nature be junk? I told 
him about some nice plants I had seen at the Zoo − a place known in our area for 
beautiful landscaping. It turns out Cornelius thinks everything at the Zoo is junk. I 
also learned that the weed I had been pulling for years was a ‘native’ wild fl ower. Not 
junk according to Cornelius. I had been pulling it because it grows abundantly and 
proliferates by needle-sharp seeds that stick to my children’s shoes and pant legs. 
Th ey have a small white fl ower that resembles Chamomile, but they quickly dry out, 
turn into brown thistle-like structures of needle-sharp seeds. In Cornelius’ nursery, 
they were everywhere. For him, they are legitimate ‘native’ plants that contribute 
to the habitats of ‘native’ insects, birds, and other animals. Driving home from the 
nursery, everything I saw along the median, in people’s front yards, back yards, and 
along the highway – nothing but junk. All junk.
As a linguist who appreciates Fillmore’s fr ame (Fillmore 1976) and Lakoff  and 
Johnson’s metaphor (Lakoff , Johnson 1980), I was struck by how much his use of 
the word ‘junk’ had aff ected me and shaken my beliefs about this space behind my 
house and my role as its creator. Junk as a fr ame evokes a narrative of being useless 
and superfl uous stuff  with no value or function. In cognitive linguistic terms, I could 
say that Cornelius refr amed the backyard for me or caused a shift  in my cognitive 
metaphor for the backyard (sensu Lakoff  and Johnson 1980) from a recreational space 
to a habitat for other animals than humans. Nature, again, was stuff  [Gerümpel]? 
Except now there was good stuff  and bad stuff .
According to this new concept that could be entitled native gardening, bad stuff  
was ‘non-native’ or ‘invasive’; and good stuff  was ‘native’. To understand the narrative 
behind the concept of native, I turned to Laura Sanagorski, an Environmental 
Horticulture Extension Agent for the University of Florida, who explained to me in an 
email that “the Florida Native Plant Society adopted the following defi nition in 1994”:
Florida native plants are those species occurring within the state boundaries 
prior to European contact, according to the best available scientifi c and historical 
documentation. More specifi cally, it includes those species understood as 
indigenous, occurring in natural associations in habitats that existed prior 
to signifi cant human impacts and alterations of the landscape. (Sanagorski, 
personal communication)
Nature conservation here, again, excludes humans according to the Modern 
Constitution that separates the two ontological zones. Th e narratives of weed-and-
feed and of native gardening alike perpetuate the Modern Constitution by separating 
(=purifying) human from non-human, nature from society. Latour (1993: 32) 
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describes the paradox of Nature and Society with three guarantees: (1) Even though 
we construct Nature, Nature is as if we did not construct it; (2) even though we do 
not construct Society, Society is as if we did construct it; and (3) Nature and Society 
must remain absolutely distinct. Th e work of purifi cation must remain absolutely 
distinct from the work of mediation.
While cognitive linguistic concepts may not work well for formulating testable 
hypotheses about how individuals construct concepts of nature, they certainly 
work well in describing and understanding my own personal transformation of 
the concept of the backyard in light of the narratives evoked by my encounter with 
Cornelius and his pronouncement of the plants I had lived with as junk. It set in 
motion a series of inferential learning about alternative narratives that I have grown 
to live by in the meantime, such as the idea that plants can be in the wrong place (e.g. 
Simberloff , Rejmanek 2011). Andreas Weber certainly knows how to exploit the 
linguistic creation of nature as a possible fuel of the revolution of the life sciences he 
is hoping for. But is it enough to change people’s beliefs? And will this work become 
visible outside of academic journals and conferences? And will these ideas manifest 
in the external pathways of the minds of those who come in touch with it?
Th e linguistic exchange of Cornelius’ narrative of junk nature was powerful, abrupt, 
and perplexing only because it was embedded in the context of his own backyard and 
the look in his eyes to gauge my reaction to his statement that everything I had was 
‘junk’. He reframed my concept of the backyard in that moment, because he declared 
my backyard to be ‘junk’ as we stood there in his backyard (see Fig. 2), our pant legs 
covered with Spanish needle (Bidens bipinnata) seeds, surrounded by the skunky smell 
of a stopper (Eugenia axillaris). Th e power to reframe emanated from this context and 
the energy in Cornelius’ presence and the beads of sweat on his forehead as a direct 
result of his dedication to put this narrative into practice day by day.
Cornelius’ yard, I realized, is like the toad in Weber’s narrative: “Don’t be afraid. 
You can get very close. And you may see the gems project into space. Th at’s fi ction, 
you say? […] A matt er of taste? Maybe you fi nd it ugly? Wait a minute. Take an-
other good look. […]” (Weber 2008: 23).
Th is may well be the only fuel for a revolution of the life sciences as Weber envi-
sions it – to commune with other beings to understand how we construct our real-
ity of nature and defi ne our role in it by understanding the narratives and umwelten 
of others. It will take such Cornelius moments or looking into the eyes of a toad. It 
will take moments of being perplexed at how others construct reality, because only 
these moments can change our “cerebral habits that determine what we do in fan-
cy and in action” (CP 3.160) that are our beliefs. What else shakes up our beliefs, 
refr ames our concepts, replaces metaphors we lived by with diff erent ones that can 
cause us to change our thinking habits and change the way we interact with other 
organisms?
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Figure 2. Yard ( Carl Terwilliger).
Conclusion
What does it take for us to see beauty in the eyes of a toad and realize that we are the 
ones creating the forest and the backyard, and we are the ones determining what is 
a weed and what isn’t?
“Th ere are no cultures,” says Latour (1993: 102). Th e toads and banana spiders, 
the forests and backyards, the homeowners and the lawn-chemical industry, 
political ecologists and economic geographers are all part of a collective (Latour 
1993). While some strategies and theoretical concepts in cognitive linguistics and 
semiotics explain what it takes to change existing habits of thought, my conclusion 
is that the revolution that shift s our att ention to all organisms as subjects will depend 
on face-to-face moments of communing with others, human and non-human, with 
an Uexküllian hybrid approach to the subjectivity of all possible umwelten. To 
convince people to think diff erently about their turf, they will have to see eye to eye 
with toads and other species to construct new narratives with or without the help of 
that powerful tool of semiotic modelling that is language (Sebeok 1991).
Will our mediation work ever become more visible than it is today? Will the 
economic geographers liberate themselves from the limitations of what’s expected 
of good social scientists? Will the political ecologists learn to analyse language as a 
modelling system to understand the concept of the forest in the West and elsewhere? 
Bruno Latour, believes that
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[seen] as networks, […], the modern world, like revolutions, permits scarcely 
anything more than small extensions of practices, slight accelerations in the 
circulation of knowledge, a tiny extension of societies, miniscule increases in 
the number of actors, small modifi cations of old beliefs. When we see them as 
networks, Western innovations remain recognizable and important, but they 
no longer suffi  ce as the stuff  of saga, a vast saga of radical rupture, fatal destiny, 
irreversible good or bad fortune. (Latour 1993: 48)
But fellow hybrids recognizing each other across new fi elds like “environmental 
humanities, ecocriticism, ecophenomenology, cultural ecology, the study of em-
bodi ment, and posthumanism” (Cobley 2010: 226) may well sustain Weber’s hope 
of a world full of subjects and a new understanding of life that corresponds to a 
new orientation in the natural sciences (cf. Hoff meyer 1996; Kull 2007: 15) and 
a gradual “modifi cation of old beliefs” that make gems appear in the eyes of toads.
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Человек, природа и семиотическое моделирование, или как 
создавать с помощью языка леса и задние дворы
В статье разъясняется, как мы с помощью языка создаем такие понятия, как лес или задний 
двор. Опираясь на утверждение Андреаса Вебера, что в науках о жизни происходит 
революция и роль людей в контексте природы переоценивается, статья исходит из 
характеристики, данной Бруно Латуром разграничению природы и культуры как 
модернистской иллюзии. Теоретические понятия, взятые из теории моделирующих систем 
и когнитивной лингвистики, помогают понять, что, хотя язык играет ключевую роль в 
конструировании новых моделей природы, тем не менее, новые когнитивные привычки 
и изменения в верованиях находятся в зависимости от непосредственной и невербальной 
коммуникации с другими организмами, как человеческими так и нечеловеческими.
Inimene, loodus ja semiootiline modelleerimine ehk 
kuidas luua keele abil metsi ja tagahoove
Artiklis selgitatakse, kuidas me loome keele abil selliseid mõisteid nagu mets või tagahoov. 
Lähtudes Andreas Weberi lootusest, et eluteadustes toimub revolutsioon ning roll, mida inimesed 
looduses mängivad, hinnatake ümber, võetakse artiklis lähtekohaks Bruno Latouri poolt antud 
iseloomustus looduse ja kultuuri vahelisele eristusele kui modernsusega saabunud illusioonile. 
Modelleerivate süsteemide teooriast ning kognitiivlingvistikast pärinevad teoreetilised mõisted 
selgitavad, et samas kui keel mängib uute loodusmudelite konstrueerimisel võtmerolli, sõltuvad 
uued kognitiivsed harjumused ning muutused uskumustes vahetust ja mitt everbaalsest 
kommuni katsioonist teiste organismidega, nii inimeste kui ka mitt einimestega.
